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Shared eHealth records systems offer promising benefits for
improving healthcare through high availability of informa-
tion and improved decision making; however, their uptake
has been hindered by concerns over the privacy of patient
information. To address these privacy concerns while bal-
ancing the requirements of healthcare professionals to have
access to the information they need to provide appropri-
ate care, the use of an Information Accountability Frame-
work (IAF) has been proposed. For the IAF and so called
Accountable-eHealth systems to become a reality, the frame-
work must provide for a diverse range of users and use cases.
The initial IAF model did not provide for more diverse use
cases including the need for certain users to delegate access
to another user in the system to act on their behalf while
maintaining accountability. In this paper, we define the re-
quirements for delegation of access in the IAF, how such
access policies would be represented in the Framework, and
implement and validate an expanded IAF model.
Keywords
Access Control, electronic health records, EHR, eHealth,
privacy, security
1. INTRODUCTION
Through a high availability of information at the point
of care while lowering costs of maintaining local eHealth
records (EHR) systems by healthcare professionals (HCPs)
[17, 32], shared eHealth records (SEHRs) offer promising
potential to improve healthcare. However, patient concerns
over the security and privacy of their information [6, 7, 26]
and HCP dissatisfaction with the systems [5] have resulted
in a slow uptake.
In the current environment, there are conflicting require-
ments between HCPs and consumers (i.e. patients). Pa-
tients desire greater control over who can access their in-
formation and how it is used, while HCPs want easy ac-
cess to as much medical information as possible to make
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well-informed decisions and believe patient’s restricting ac-
cess to their EHRs would be detrimental to the quality of
care [30]. This conflict was highlighted in the recent re-
view of Australia’s national Personally Controlled Electronic
Health Record (PCEHR) system [8]. In the patient con-
trolled model, HCPs are unable to rely on a SEHR as a
complete source of information on a patient they are treat-
ing, and as a result, HCPs might be discouraged from using
such systems [20, 12]. An appropriate balance of these com-
peting concerns must be achieved so that the full benefits of
systems like the PCEHR can be achieved.
To achieve the desired balance, the use of information ac-
countability (IA), and specifically an Information Account-
ability Framework (IAF), in eHealth systems has been pro-
posed [11]. These so called Accountable-eHealth (AeH) sys-
tems ensure health information is available to the right per-
son at the right time without rigid barriers while empowering
the consumers with information control and transparency.
However, AeH systems have yet to be implemented and a
number of technical challenges must be investigated before
they can become a reality.
The initial IAF model assumes all users of the system
have an equal ability to interact with the system. However,
the model does not support more diverse use cases. There
are a number of reasons that someone may require another
person to act on their behalf in an eHealth system. For
example, parents may need to act on behalf of their children;
or a carer or another trusted individual may need to act on
behalf a person with a disability. For the IAF to meet the
needs of these stakeholders, it must be expanded to support
users being able to grant revocable, time-dependent access
for someone to act on their behalf.
In this paper, we explore the implementation of delegated
access into the IAF for use in eHealth systems. We begin in
Section 2 with a discussion of related work. Section 3 defines
our threat model. Section 4 explains information account-
ability and the IAF model. In Section 5, the requirements
for delegated access, properties of access policies, and repre-
sentation of the policies are defined and discussed. Section 6
covers the verification of the implementation and modelling
of the defined requirements in a prototype of the IAF. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
Information contained in eHealth systems is often very
sensitive in nature, and as such, it is vital that access to
that information is appropriately managed. When imple-
menting an EHR system, the security of the stored data,
access control and access monitoring must all be considered
[26]. Traditional preventive access control measures that
rigidly deny access to users without appropriate permissions
are insufficient on their own in the domains like eHealth with
its complex access requirements, and as a result a number
of researchers have begun working on augmenting these pre-
ventive measures with accountability [9, 31, 28].
Information Accountability involves the use of policies and
mechanisms to enforce appropriate use through after-the-
fact accountability for intentional misuse. Misuse is defined
as the unauthorised access, use, modification, or disclosure
of information, or other use of information that is not for
the purpose for which the information was provided [23, 16].
The presence of IA mechanisms is intended to act as a de-
terrent for such misuse [9].
With information dissemination being one of the primary
causes of concern among consumers, it is important that it
is clear to patients how their information is used, and who
it will be disclosed to both now and in the future [25]. Such
transparency is one of the fundamental aspects of Informa-
tion Accountability [31].
There have been a number of proposed approaches to im-
plementing IA mechanisms, such as Jagadeesan et. al. [18]
who attempted to develop a formal foundation for the design
of IA systems using privacy policies to define appropriate use
of information, focusing on using audit logs that can detect
potential policy violations and information misuse. Their
approach focused on using audit logs which can detect po-
tential policy violations and information misuse. Weitzner
et. al. [31] proposed a transparent audit process that would
track all transaction, and make use of policies combined with
policy-aware transaction logs and a policy reasoning capabil-
ity to enable systems to hold users of information account-
able. These studies generally focused on IA and accountable
systems from a general point of view without consideration
for the specific requirements of eHealth systems.
3. THREAT MODEL
Access control consists of two key parts: authentication
and authorisation. Authentication is the process of a user
of the system verifying a claimed identity, for example using
a password, key, etc., and authorisation refers to what users
are allowed to do in a system [29]. In this work, we assume
an appropriate authentication mechanism has successfully
verified that a user is who they say they are. We’re interested
in holding authenticated users accountable for their actions
within the system.
Our primary concern is with ‘insider threats’, which in-
clude accidental disclosures, insider curiosity and data breach
by an insider [3]. Insider threats are a serious concern for
the privacy and security of patient data, with 17.5 percent
of all health provider privacy breaches that were made pub-
lic in the US between 2005 and 2014 being due to insider
threats [24].
In dealing with insider threats, we assume the “attacker”
in our scenarios is a valid, authenticated user in the system,
with access to certain patient information. This patient in-
formation may include a patient’s full healthcare informa-
tion in system as well as their address, birth date, and other
personally identifiable information. In Australia, health in-
formation may only be used in order provide healthcare to
an individual, and a small number of other limited purposes
such as for approved research [16]. An attacker’s abilities
Figure 1: An Accountable-eHealth prototype architecture
[15]
may also include the ability to modify or add to patient
records in the system.
4. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY
FRAMEWORK
An Information Accountability Framework was devised
for use in eHealth systems to implement IA protocols. In
a simplified view, four types of users are initially modelled
into the framework: data owners (i.e patients), data users
(i.e healthcare professionals) using health information for
legitimate purposes, data users who misuse health informa-
tion, and a central health authority (HA) (i.e. a government
agency). In the eHealth context, patients have explicit con-
trol over which HCPs can access their information and are
able to grant or limit access to their health information by
setting usage policies with a HA in place to guarantee that
HCPs always have the access they need to provide appropri-
ate care without unnecessarily hindering the patient’s pri-
vacy [14].
The presence of the IA mechanisms aims to implement
appropriate use by authenticated users by deterring them
from intentionally misusing information. The accountability
mechanisms enables users who misuse information to be held
accountable and deters those with ill intent through a fear
of being caught, with clear messaging of the consequences of
actions conveyed to users. Incentives are given to the users
to follow the procedures and enforce appropriate use.
A key component of accountable systems are policy-aware
transaction logs [31] which provide provenance of the data
in the system. Using such logs, the provenance of the data
can be compared to usage policies to determine if an action
complied with those policies [1]. In the IAF all information
access and other actions in the system are logged along with
policy used to determine whether the action should be per-

















Listing 1: Time-dependent policy
a user-friendly format which they can review at any time.
The IAF does not just provide these logs, but actively mon-
itors all actions taken in the system for potential breaches of
policy and provides notifications as needed. When a HCP
makes an invalid access request for example, the system no-
tifies the patient of the potential misuse of their eHealth
information with a log that can be reviewed and referred to
when submitting an inquiry asking the HCP to justify their
actions [15].
When the system detects possible misuse of a patient’s
health data, the patient is able to submit an inquiry asking
for a justification of the actions taken by the relevant HCP.
The HCP must then provide an explanation to justify their
need to access the relevant information. Once this is done,
the system uses a semantic reasoner and rules defined by a
HA along with the context of the information access, usage
policies, and the HCP’s justification to determine whether
misuse occurred and further investigation is required.
This model has been validated and surveys conducted into
user acceptance, but it hasn’t been fully implemented and
it must be expanded to provide for more diverse users and
use cases, including the ability to delegate access to another




In this section we define the properties delegated access
should have in the IAF, why they are required, and how
they can be implemented.
5.1 The need for delegation of access in
Accountable-eHealth systems
In an accountable system, it is essential that it is clear
who is performing a given action so that they can be held
accountable in the event of misuse. Therefore, it follows
that it is important that accounts are not shared. However,
not all users have the same ability to interact with a sys-
tem. It is common, for example, for people with disabilities
to share access to accounts with carers or family members
[27]. Likewise parents in general manage their children’s




























Listing 2: Transaction log of a delegated access event
patients should be able to delegate control over their EHR
to a trusted person [2]. An AeH system must support these
use cases while ensuring the actual person performing the
action can be identified and held accountable if necessary.
In the previous work developing an IAF, patients were as-
sumed to be a homogeneous group with an equal ability to
interact with an eHealth system, which they are not. The
IAF model needs to be expanded to provide for diversity
of users, including enabling users to grant permission for
someone to act on their behalf.
While patients delegating control over their EHR policies
is the primary use case for delegated access, there may also
be reasons under certain conditions where a HCP may del-
egate access to others for limited purposes such as in order
to have an assistant add information to a patient’s record.
Such situations can be limited by policies set by the HA to
control what delegated access can be granted in what con-
text.
5.2 Requirements for delegated access policies
The following defines the requirements that the usage poli-
cies set by the user delegating access should have when im-
plemented in the IAF.
5.2.1 Easily revocable
A property of the policies for delegation of access is that
they must be easy to revoke. If the data owner or other
user with the authority to grant access to an EHR decides
the user who has been granted delegated access shouldn’t
be able to perform the granted actions any more, then the
process to revoke the policy should be simple and take effect
immediately.
5.2.2 Time-dependent
These policies must be able to be limited to a specified
period of time. This is important so that a policy will expire
when a person’s need to act on someone’s behalf is gone.
Examples of when this would be needed include:
• A parent’s access to manage their child’s EHR should
expire when they turn 18
• A carer’s with a limited term employment with a par-
ticular patient has their contract conclusion date in-
cluded in the access policy
5.2.3 Granular
These policies must be as granular as the usage policies
set on HCPs by patients. Rather than just being able to
grant complete access to act on someone else’s behalf, the
policies should enable user’s to grant access to specific ac-
tions and/or types of data in limited contexts and prevent
access to everything else. Likewise, the HA must be able
to limit how much access can be granted to different users
depending on the context. Examples of granular policies
include:
• A nurse in a General Practice may need to perform ac-
tions on non-sensitive information for a patient record
that one of the doctor’s in the practice has been granted
access to, such as to update certain patient details or
add non-sensitive information, but not have access to
anything else in the record
• An assistant may need access to add information en
masse without needing to see existing record entries,
and so can be restricted to be only able to append
items to the record and only view items they added
5.2.4 Policy included in provenance log
As with the usage policies set by patients on their HCPs
in the existing IAF model, the policy used to perform an
action on behalf of another user must be captured in the
provenance log entry.
5.3 Representation
One of the technical challenges when implementing AeH
systems is representing and manipulating usage policies [10].
In the IAF, the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [21],
an open standard Digital Rights Management (DRM) lan-
guage, was chosen to represent information usage policies be-
cause it is independent of implementation constraints and is
capable of expressing a wide range of policy-based informa-
tion. Other similar policy languages include the Extensible
Access Control Markup Language (XAML) and Enterprise
Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL).
ODRL can be used to represent access delegation policies
and meet the requirements of such policies. The restric-
tions placed on the access policy including who the access
is delegated to, the expiration of the access, and the types
of actions, data and the contexts for which the access is
granted can all be expressed in ODRL through constraints
and duties.
Time limits can be defined in “dateTime” constraints. As
an example, Listing 1 shows a policy represented in ODRL
where a member of a Health Authority has granted access to
a carer to modify a patient’s usage policies for their EHR.
Figure 4: Alice X managing Jane X’s usage policies
The constraint limits the validity of this policy so that it
expires on the 10th of June 2015.
When an action is logged, it is important the current state
of the policy used to determine if the action was compliant
needs to be captured. We can represent transaction logs in
ODRL with the current policy included in the log. Listing 2




A web-based prototype of the IAF in an example EHR
system has been developed to demonstrate and validate the
framework’s functionality. In testing the implementation of
delegated access in the IAF prototype, a number of expected
scenarios were developed to demonstrate and verify the func-
tionality within the example AeH system. In this section,
we describe three such scenarios that demonstrate different
hypothetical situations and outcomes.
These scenarios demonstrate the necessity for delegated
access, and are used to test and validate the functionality
of the implemented requirements for delegated access in the
IAF in prototype systems.
6.1.1 Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, a parent is given complete access to man-
age their child’s EHR, including granting HCPs access to
the record, modifying their usage policy, and reviewing log
entries. The policy will be set by the managing health au-
thority and will be set to expire on the date of the child’s
18th birthday or another date relevant to the given legal
system.
In the scenario, the parent, “Alice X”, is taking their child,
“Jane X”, to a new dermatologist, Dr. S. They grant Dr. S
access to their child’s record, but restrict access to the child’s
mental health history. During an investigation, deeming it
necessary to provide appropriate care, Dr. S overrides the
usage policy to access Alice X’s mental health history. Jane
X is notified of this and submits an inquiry asking Dr. S
to explain his actions. Figure 4 shows the view of Alice X
managing Jane X’s usage policy in the example AeH system.
6.1.2 Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, a healthcare worker, “Bob”, is given access
to manage the record of a patient with a mental disability
Figure 2: Delegated Access Usage Query model in UPPAAL
Figure 3: Policy Data model in UPPAAL
under their care. The access is granted by the relevant health
authority and is set to expire at regular intervals requiring
explicit renewing of the policy subject to review.
An example flow in this scenario is that Bob grants ac-
cess to view the patient’s record to a General Practitioner,
Dr. Y, who the patient is seeing for a chest infection. The
GP by default does not need access to the patient’s mental
health history, but during the treatment, needs to prescribe
a medication that may have side effects when combined with
other medication. As a result, Dr. Y queries current med-
ications the patient is taking, which includes parts of the
mental health record. This is flagged for review in the pa-
tient’s log, but, understanding the situation, Bob marks the
access event as OK.
6.1.3 Scenario 3
In Scenario 3, a doctor grants access to one of the nurses
caring for one of his patients to add data to the record. The
access is granted by the doctor and will be revoked upon the
patient’s discharge from the hospital. The access is limited
so that the nurse can only view the items in the record that
they added. This is represented in the policy as an extra
constraint on whether they are the author of the item being
viewed. The nurse adds three items to the record, and can
view them in the interface in order to review and correct
them. Upon attempting to view an unrelated area of the
patient’s record, they are denied access.
6.2 Modelling
The access requirements for delegation of access in the
IAF were modelled using UPPAAL. UPPAAL is a model-
checker jointly developed by Uppsala University in Sweden
and Aalborg University in Denmark that enables the verifi-
cation of real-time systems that can be modelled as networks
of timed automata [4]. Its main components are a system
editor for creating models, the simulator that allows you to
simulate the behaviour of the system, and the verifier which
analyses the model’s behaviour.
Figures 2 and 3 show the IAF’s usage query service for
checking delegated access modelled in UPPAAL. We define
a user “Bob” who will act as the user who is delegated access
for a given action. Using the verifier on this model, we
can test the defined requirements for delegated access are
satisfied. For example, to check that there exists a path
where access is allowed to modify a patient’s usage policy
by a delegate we can use the following query:
E<> (userIsDelegate && userActionAllowed && !
policyExpired && Bob.
ModifyUsagePolicyForPatient)
The result from the verifier for this query is “Property
is satisfied”, meaning our requirement is met. Then we can
verify that there does not exist a path that would grant
access to modify the policy when the delegate policy expires
or if the user is not a delegate using the following queries:
E<> (!userIsDelegate && Bob.
ModifyUsagePolicyForPatient)
E<> (userIsDelegate && policyExpired && Bob.
ModifyUsagePolicyForPatient)
Both of these queries result in “Property is not satisfied”,
verifying that there is no such path in the model and our
requirement is met. Additionally, it is important that a user
cannot delegate access to perform an action they themselves
cannot perform. To verify there does not exist a path where
Bob can perform an action that the user who delegated them
access cannot, we can use the following query:
E<> (userIsDelegate && userActionAllowed && !
delegatorAllowedAction && Bob.
ModifyUsagePolicyForPatient)
Using this method of testing the model, we were able to
verify that the protocol met the delegation of access require-
ments defined earlier in the paper.
6.3 Implementation
As part of validating the IAF protocols, they are being
implemented into existing EHR systems. This is being done
using the open source OpenEMR, which is used around the
world, and FluxMED, a customisable EHR system designed
to easily collect and manage different types of medical data
[13].
When implementing the IAF protocols into an EHR sys-
tem such as OpenEMR or FluxMED, either natively or as a
service, it is important that the eHealth data is structured
so that the type of data being accessed can be matched with
usage policies. Additionally, the EHR system must be modi-
fied to log all events with the context of the event and policy
used to permit or restrict access to the information, while
ensuring the non-repudiation of the log entries. It must also
be possible for HCPs to override patient usage policies when
the need arises while the system provides clear communica-
tion to the HCP that their action is being recorded and may
be investigated if misuse is suspected. This will often require
appropriate changes to the front-end of the EHR system.
OpenEMR is used by many practices throughout the world
and offers various features including the “Patient Portal”
which lets patients access their medical information and
communicate with their HCPs through the Web [22]. This
functionality makes it useful as a case study for implement-
ing the IAF, though there are challenges in doing so, such
as ensuring all entered information is appropriately typed.
Additionally, the existing logging and auditing mechanisms
in OpenEMR are not comprehensive, do not ensure non-
repudiation, and are modifiable by administrators making
them untrustworthy [19].
After previously implementing the IAF protocols into Open-
EMR, we have further implemented the requirements for
delegated access defined in this paper to demonstrate their
functionality. To depict Scenario 3 in the OpenEMR, we
define a usage policy by the Physician “Dr. S” to delegate
access to “Nurse Y” to add entries to a patient’s record, but
only to be able to view entries that they created. This is ac-
complished by augmenting OpenEMR’s access control mech-
anisms. The system first matches the usage policy’s append-
only constraint to OpenEMR’s ‘addonly’ permission, then
it augments the ‘view’ permission to restrict which informa-
Figure 5: Adding a diagnosis in OpenEMR
(a) The patient’s medical problems as viewed by Dr. S
(b) The patient’s medical problems as viewed by Nurse Y
Figure 6: Medical problems view under different policies
tion is viewable. Each action is logged along with the usage
policy that was used at the time.
In the scenario, Nurse Y adds information about Patient
X’s new diagnosis of diabetes as shown in Figure 5. The
patient has previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Upon submitting the new diagnosis the Nurse is able to view
it under the patient’s medical problems, but cannot view the
schizophrenia diagnosis, while Dr. S can view both as shown
in Figure 6.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The IAF balances the sometimes competing requirements
of HCPs and consumers by ensuring the right information is
available to the right person at the right time while empow-
ering patients with control and transparency over how their
information is used and accessed. In doing so, it enables the
creation of accountable-eHealth systems where the benefits
of shared eHealth records systems can be more fully realised.
While the initial IAF model has been investigated for its
acceptability by users, it had not yet been implemented and
a number of challenges remain. Among them is the need
to provide for more diverse use cases including the ability
to delegate access to another user in the system to act on
your behalf while maintaining accountability. In this work,
the requirements for delegated access in the IAF were ex-
plored, and an expanded IAF model was implemented and
validated.
This expanded IAF model and the defined requirements
can be used to implement more useful AeH systems and is
being implemented in a more full-featured prototype that
will integrate the IAF into an existing EHR system. This
full-featured prototype will be used in further studies with
users to verify the practicality and suitability of the IAF as
a solution to patient privacy concerns and HCP information
access requirements. Accountable-eHealth system have the
potential to solve the information privacy conundrum and
enable improved healthcare through the high availability of
clinical information, and this research aims to bring us closer
to making such systems a reality.
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